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Abstract:  Economists have long been interested in measuring distributional impacts of 
policy  interventions.  As  environmental  justice  (EJ)  emerged  as  an  ethical  issue  in  the 
1970s, the academic literature has provided statistical analyses of the incidence and causes 
of various environmental outcomes as they relate to race, income, and other demographic 
variables.  In  the  context  of  regulatory  impacts,  however,  there  is  a  lack  of  consensus 
regarding what information is relevant for EJ analysis, and how best to present it. This 
paper helps frame the discussion by suggesting a set of questions fundamental to regulatory 
EJ analysis, reviewing past approaches to quantifying distributional equity, and discussing 
the potential for adapting existing tools to the regulatory context. 
Keywords:  environmental  justice;  regulatory  impact  analysis;  distributional  analysis; 
equity; inequality index 
 
1. Introduction 
Economists have been interested in analyzing the distribution of environmental benefits for almost 
as long as they have been calculating the benefits themselves. While the tools for conducting benefits 
analysis are well developed, those for examining equity, or distributional effects, are less so.  
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Most  OECD  countries  routinely  perform  a  regulatory  impact  analysis  of  significant  new 
environmental rules [1]. These analyses typically contain an estimate of monetized benefits and costs 
of options under consideration. They may also discuss how these benefits and costs are distributed 
across various subgroups, economic sectors, or regions. In the U.S., various Executive Orders (EO) 
require some distributional analysis (e.g., EO 13045 addresses children’s health, EO 13211 addresses 
energy issues). Relevant to this discussion, EO 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental 
Justice  in  Minority  Population  and  Low-Income  Populations,  requires  federal  agencies  to  address 
“disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects…on minority populations 
and low-income populations” [2]. To date, however, implementation of EO 12898 has been slow and 
inconsistent (see [3,4] for critiques of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) implementation). 
To be useful in the policy-making process, distributional analysis should facilitate the ranking of 
alternative outcomes. Such rankings are inherently normative, and thus should reflect the views of 
society as opposed the views of the technical staff preparing the analysis. There is a tradeoff. Purely 
descriptive  analysis  such  as  pollution  exposure  rates  by  subgroup  may  be  difficult  to  digest  and 
interpret in a consistent manner. However, methods for aggregating the data into easily presented 
rankings have the potential for implicitly reflecting staff value judgments. Ideally, the analysis would 
be prepared in a manner that is easy to understand yet flexible enough to allow normative judgments to 
be imposed explicitly.  
In addition, for purposes of both decision-making and environmental justice there is a need for 
consistency and transparency. These concepts are related. Consistency implies that the decision-maker 
uses  a  similar  framework  to  make  decisions  across  rules.  If  a  certain  distribution  of  outcomes  is 
preferred to another for one pollutant, then a similar ordering should be preserved for others. For the 
purposes of EJ, defined by the U.S. EPA to include “fair treatment and meaningful involvement,” 
transparency  in  decision-making  is  essential  [5].  Interested  parties  should  be  able  to  identify  the 
information  and  methodology  used  to  make  a  decision  is  a  way  that  is  clear  and  accessible.  In 
identifying methods for use in EJ analysis for regulatory policy we are cognizant of the need for both 
consistency and transparency.  
Here,  we  present  various  methods  used  in  the  (mostly)  economics  literature  to  quantify  the 
distribution of environmental impacts, and evaluate their usefulness through the prism of how the 
results can be used to guide the environmental regulatory process. The few examples discussed here 
are not intended to be comprehensive (for recent reviews of the EJ literature see [6-8]). We begin 
Section  2  with  a  discussion  of  three  fundamental  questions  that  a  distributional  analysis  of 
environmental  policy  options  could  address.  In  Section  3  we  describe  efforts  in  the  literature  to 
describe environmental or health outcomes for different subgroups. Since the objective of most of 
these studies is to describe existing distributions, we discuss how they may be adapted to the purpose 
of  evaluating  prospective  policy  options.  In  Section  4  we  describe  methods  (Lorenz  curves, 
concentration curves, and inequality indices) to aggregate this information in a way that allows one to 
rank policies in a transparent and consistent manner. In Section 5 we offer concluding thoughts and 
some potential steps forward. 
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2. Three Fundamental Questions for Regulatory EJ Analysis 
Environmental justice is a concern that certain subgroups, typically defined by race or income, have 
historically borne a disproportionate share of environmental burdens. In the context of new regulations 
it is important to outline a consistent set of questions a distributional analysis of environmental policy 
could address.  
With regulatory impact analysis the primary concern is distributional effects associated with options 
under consideration, as opposed to the causes of inequities typically investigated by the academic 
literature. The goal is to provide the decision-maker and public with information regarding the degree 
to  which  regulatory  options  under  consideration  remove  or  worsen  previous  disparities  in 
environmental outcomes for vulnerable communities, or create new disparities where none existed. As 
such, it is important to analyze changes in distributions of environmental outcomes between baseline 
and various policy options, rather than just the distribution of changes (since an unequal distribution of 
environmental improvements may actually help alleviate existing disparities).  
Before turning to the questions to guide the analysis, it is important to identify the outcome to be 
measured. Options include pollution (e.g., parts per million of ozone), health effects (e.g., number of 
cases of asthma), and monetized benefits (e.g., willingness to pay for reductions in asthma cases). Here, 
we adopt the position dominant in the environmental justice community (if not the economic literature) 
that the distribution of physical outcomes (e.g., pollution or health effects), rather than their monetized 
value is most appropriate for regulatory analysis. 
Methods  for  attributing  monetary  value  to  environmental  outcomes  (such  as  health  impacts) 
typically  employ  measures  of  individuals’  willingness  to  pay  for  a  small  improvement  in 
environmental quality. These monetary values can be used to analyze the distribution of changes in 
environmental outcomes, but are not useful for comparing distributions of outcomes before and after a 
policy intervention. Such a comparison would require individuals’ total money-metric utility (i.e., not 
just the value of the change in utility), which current techniques generally do not calculate (for an 
overview of methods for monetizing environmental outcomes, see [9]). 
We also focus exclusively on the distribution of environmental outcomes, not the distribution of 
economic costs (e.g., higher prices or reduced employment) associated with a particular regulatory 
option.  For  a  recent  survey  of  the  economic  literature  analyzing  the  incidence  of  the  costs  of 
environmental regulation (primarily by income group), see [7]. Whether to use pollution or health 
effects depends on data availability. Since they most directly affect human well-being, health effects 
are the most relevant outcome. When this information is unavailable, pollution exposure levels may be 
a useful proxy, followed by ambient pollution concentrations, plant emissions, and proximity to a 
source [10,11]. 
It  is  useful  for  the  analysis  to  begin  with  an  understanding  of  the  baseline  distribution  of  the 
environmental outcome of concern: 
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(1). What is the baseline distribution of the environmental outcome? 
Establishing  a  proper  baseline  distribution  is  crucial  for  two  reasons.  First,  identification  of  a  
pre-existing disparity presents an opportunity to tailor policy options to address the disproportionate 
impact directly. Second, the baseline establishes a marker for determining distributional impacts of the 
policy itself. Once the baseline has been established, it is useful for the analysis to predict the ex-post 
distributional effects of the regulatory options under consideration. 
(2). What is the distribution of the environmental outcome for each regulatory option? 
While the options under consideration may be implemented uniformly (e.g., the same standard 
would apply to all individuals, geographic locations, or types of facilities), the distribution of the 
pollutant in the predicted post-regulatory scenarios may differ for several reasons. First, the type of 
regulation may  affect  the post-regulatory  distribution. For example, a uniform rate-based  standard 
(per unit of output) means that facilities with higher output will generally have higher post-regulatory 
emissions. Second, to the extent that different types of individuals (e.g., low-income) have different 
sensitivities to a given pollutant or different exposure pathways, some individuals will experience a 
different post-regulatory scenario than others. Answering this question for prospective options requires 
the capacity to  model alternative outcomes.  Finally, it is important to assess the degree to which 
various policy options create or remove disproportionate impacts. 
(3).  How  do  the  policy  options  being  considered  improve  or  worsen  the  distribution  of  the 
environmental outcome with respect to vulnerable subgroups? 
Answering  this  question  requires  a  methodology  for  comparing  the  answers  to  the  first  two 
questions in order to determine whether a regulation represents an improvement to the status quo and 
other considered options, and ideally an indication as to how much.  
Responses to these three questions can be presented in conjunction with net benefits arising from 
the policy options. This combination of information would enable policy makers to understand the 
possible  tradeoffs  between  environmental  justice  and  overall  economic  efficiency  implicit  in  the 
decision-making process. It is important to note that there may be limited opportunities within the 
policy  design  itself  to  address  any  post-regulatory  distributional  effects.  Regardless,  clear 
documentation  and  acknowledgment  of those effects  is informative to the decision-maker and  the 
public, and may help guide future policy. 
These  three  questions  provide  a  basic  framework  to  inform  the  distributional  analysis  for 
environmental regulatory policy. This framework also enables analysts to identify if and how existing 
disparities  may  be  addressed  through  the  regulatory  context,  recognizing  that  legal,  political,  and 
enforceability constraints may prevent any action in this regard. 
Note  that  such  an  analysis  may  not  always  be  feasible.  Data  constraints  may  prevent  the 
identification of existing or post-regulatory disparities. The geographic distribution of the pollutant 
may  be  unknown,  for  example.  While  advances  in  air  monitoring  and  modeling  allow  for  more 
detailed assessments of how pollutants are dispersed, such analytical efforts require significant time 
and resource allocations. Some water pollutants are even more problematic as little is known about the 
fate of a pollutant after discharge. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Related  to  the  issue  of  data  constraints  is  the  fact  that  both  pollution  dispersion  models  and 
demographic  information  are  imperfect.  Regarding  pollution  there  is  uncertainty  in  the  models  or 
monitoring or sampling used to generate baseline and control scenarios. The quality of the data is also 
likely to vary across pollutants. With respect to demographic information, data such as income levels 
are typically publicly available only at an aggregated level. The U.S. Census, for example, reports 
median income at the block group level. As it is beyond the scope of this article to develop tools for 
incorporating uncertainty, decision-makers’ risk preferences, and other practical implementation issues 
into the distributional analysis, we leave these topics for future research. Other authors have examined 
related issues, however. Hubbell et al. [12], for example, discuss the role of error in air pollution 
dispersion models. For a discussion of methods for incorporating sampling error into inequality index 
analysis, see [13-15]. For a methodology to address the bias introduced by assigning median income to 
all residents of a Census block group, see [16]. 
Moreover, answering these three questions is by no means sufficient for addressing all EJ issues. 
For example, analysis that focuses on a single pollutant typically does not account for the contribution 
of cumulative effects from other pollutants or multiple exposures from sources outside the scope of the 
proposed rule. Disproportionately affected communities may suffer from multiple stressors that have 
accumulated over decades. One specific pollutant may show little impact or may even be distributed 
fairly evenly. In an area with multiple waste sites or polluting facilities, however, the marginal effect 
of a particular pollutant may be greater than in a community without such stressors.  
Related to this point, analysis focusing on pollution concentrations or exposure levels, rather than 
health outcomes may also fail to account for baseline differences in health risks across racial and 
ethnic groups and income categories. Such differences may exist due to genetic, cultural, or other  
un-accounted factors. There is increasing evidence that the same exposure affects people differently, 
and  those  effects  can  vary  along  racial  and  ethnic  lines  and  socioeconomic  status.  In  addition, 
individuals with low incomes have less access to averting behaviors and resources, like medical care, 
alternative water sources, or housing options that allow them to avoid exposures. Thus, assuming that 
exposure affects everyone in the same manner may be misleading. 
With these caveats in mind, we now discuss ways to present information in a way that is helpful for 
addressing these three questions.  
3. Describing Distributions 
A  tradeoff  exists  between  providing  information  in  a  way  that  is  useful  to  policy  makers  and 
imposing ethical assumptions on the part of the analyst. This section describes quantitative methods 
that have been used to describe the distributional effects of various environmental outcomes with a 
minimum of ethical input.  
Distributional  effects  are  quantified  in  a  variety  of  ways  in  the  academic  literature.  While  a 
consensus  has  not  been  reached  on  how  best  to  analyze,  quantify,  and  present  the  results  of  an 
environmental justice analysis, a suite of methods has emerged over the last few decades that can be 
categorized as visual displays, summary statistics, and regression results. The variation in methods 
both within and across these categorizes can be attributed to author preference or expertise, as well as Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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the research question at hand. In this section we survey key methods for quantifying distributional 
effects and evaluate their effectiveness in addressing the policy questions outlined above. 
3.1. Visual Displays 
The use of charts, graphs, and maps can be useful to provide an overview of the data and results 
used  in  analysis.  Beginning  with  the  earliest  study  in  our  review,  Dorfman  [17]  examines  the 
distribution  of  benefits  and  costs  of  environmental  programs.  Results  are  shown  graphically  as  a 
percent of household income. Shadbegian et al. [18] reported one of the few distributional analyses of 
a  specific rule.  They  show  the  distribution  of  monetized  benefits  and  costs  from  the  SO2  trading 
program across U.S. regions. Results are presented using tables and maps.  
The graphical displays, as well as those that use maps to present information (e.g., [18-21]) are a 
useful complement to other quantifiable information. Geographic Information System generated maps 
are  useful  for  suggesting  trends,  showing  the  general  location  of  where  pollution  is  greatest  or 
disparities are most pronounced. However, in terms of analyzing the baseline or ex-post distribution of 
pollution,  such  displays  are  suggestive  at  best,  and  lack  the  level  of  detail  required  in  a  
decision-making  context.  In  particular,  they  can  be  effective  at  conveying  differences  between 
baselines and policy options if the differences are stark. For more subtle changes, however, they are 
less useful. 
3.2. Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics are a key component of any empirical analysis, providing the reader with an 
important overview of the data used in the study. These statistics typically include information on the 
number of observations associated with a particular variable, some measure of central tendency, such 
as the mean or median, and a measure of dispersion, such as the standard deviation. Although they are 
quite  simple,  these  statistics  can  provide  useful  insights  into  the  patterns  of  disparities  regarding 
environmental outcomes. In addition, summary statistics can be applied consistently across regulatory 
scenarios  and  are  typically  transparent  to  the  reader.  Information  on  the  quantity  of  a  particular 
pollutant across income quintiles or racial groups, for example, gives insight into whether or not the 
pollutant  is  evenly  distributed,  and  this  may  be  accompanied  by  some  measure  of  statistical 
significance. With respect to the questions outlined above, these statistics are useful for establishing 
baseline  incidence  of  environmental  burdens,  and  can  be  used  to  measure  both  post-regulatory 
incidence and changes in incidence. 
Asch and Seneca [22] and Harrison and Rubenfield [23] are two early studies of the distribution of 
pollution in the U.S. Both studies examine the distribution of air pollution across various demographic 
variables, including income and race. Relevant for the policy questions we pose, the authors analyze 
both the baseline and the changes in air pollution due to current regulations. Asch and Seneca [22] find 
that the baseline distribution of particulate matter was regressive. Using the correlation between seven 
categories of income and particulates in 284 U.S. cities they find that z-statistics show a positive 
correlation for the lower income groups and that regulations helped ameliorate these effects. 
Harrison and Rubenfield [23] show baseline and control scenario exposure to NOx concentrations 
for seven income groups in Boston. They show the concentration levels across the income groups for Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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the baseline and control scenarios and make some qualitative statements about the results (e.g., the 
distribution of baseline concentrations is fairly even across income groups, but the poor receive more 
benefits from reductions).  
More recently, Brajer and Hall [24] examine changes in ozone and particulate matter with respect to 
various demographic variables for the Los Angeles basin for 1990–1999. The data are presented as 
“population  weighted  pollution  levels”  by  county,  race  and  income.  A  Spearman  rank  correlation 
analysis shows correlation between pollution and socio-economic variables. They find that pollution 
has fallen over the decade in the region, but the air quality gains are not evenly distributed.  
While  this  brief  review  is  not  comprehensive,  it  provides  a  sense  of  the  type  of  information 
summary statistics convey in the literature. The methods are straightforward and easily understood, 
and  are  useful  for  answering  the  first  two  questions  in  Section  2.  They  provide  useful  baseline 
information  regarding  outcomes  across  subgroups,  as  well  as  the  correlation  between  group 
characteristics  and  environmental  outcomes.  When  combined  with  models  that  predict  pollutant 
responses, they could provide similar information for alternative regulatory options.  
Summary  statistics  are  unlikely  to  contain  sufficient  information  regarding  the  third  question, 
however. They are not useful for evaluating the relative merits of regulatory options (including the 
status quo) since they do not reflect distributions within subgroups. Such information can be important 
since the impact of a pollutant may be more of a concern if it is concentrated in a hotspot among a 
relatively small group of individuals than if it is evenly spread across the sub-population. In such 
situations, focusing on averages or correlations can be misleading since a low average exposure may 
mask very high exposure for a subset of individuals within a group. There may be an undetected EJ 
problem if such hotspots occur primarily in vulnerable subgroups. 
In addition, these statistics do not provide a clear, systematic ranking of alternatives. Different 
policy options may involve tradeoffs between total improvements across all groups and reducing the 
disparities among groups. Simple averages or correlations provide no guidance regarding a transparent 
way to resolve these conflicts within one regulatory analysis, much less consistently across rules. 
3.3. Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis is a cornerstone of empirical economic analysis. It allows researchers to use 
data to provide internally consistent, unbiased hypothesis testing. In terms of environmental justice, 
regression analysis is frequently used to identify the existence and causes of various environmental 
outcomes across subgroups. By controlling for confounding factors, researchers can identify impacts 
of key independent variables on measures of interest. There are numerous ways to conduct regression 
analysis in the context of EJ; here we highlight a few.  
A  common  framework  is  to  use  a  probability-based  model  to  account  for  the  fact  that  not  all 
locations experience a particular outcome (e.g., toxic releases or facility siting), and there may be 
systematic differences between areas with and without the release. Baden et al. [25] conducted an 
analysis  of  Superfund  sites  using  a  logit  model  and  control  for  location  characteristics,  such  as 
population density, population size, and state fixed effects. Results show a significant and positive 
relationship between the percent Black and Hispanic and the probability of having a Superfund site, 
and that the higher the income the less likely the area has a site. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Downey  et  al.  [26]  examine  toxicity-weighted  U.S.  air  pollution  Risk-Screen  Environmental 
Indicators data and their distribution across race and ethnicities. The authors assign each of six race 
and ethnic groups within metropolitan areas a score based on exposure to air pollution. They use a 
logit model to examine how income affects the probability of receiving a high score, controlling for 
community characteristics, such as density, employment, region, etc. They find a strong link between 
income and disparities in releases across 329 metropolitan areas, but the link with race is less significant. 
Wolverton  [27]  uses  a  conditional  logit  model  to  examine  plant  siting  decisions  by  using  of 
community characteristics at time of siting, rather than after construction. This distinction is important 
since facility siting can cause housing prices or wages to change in affected areas, which in turn can 
lead to migration that alters a location’s demographic characteristics. Controlling for several variables 
including property values, wage rates, education, employment, etc., she finds that income, but not race, 
affects location decisions. 
Arora and Cason [28] use a Tobit model to examine the effect of neighborhood characteristics on 
Toxics Release Inventory emissions by ZIP code for 1990. They first estimate the probability that a 
geographic area has a facility with releases, and estimate the size of the release in a second stage. The 
authors find that there is a significant coefficient on race variables in the Southeast. The coefficients 
suggest that areas with more non-white residents are more likely to have higher emissions. Income 
follows an inverted U-pattern; emissions initially increase with income until reaching a point after 
which emissions fall as income rises.  
Fowlie  et  al.  [21]  use  a  difference-in-difference  approach  to  examine  the  relationship  between 
emissions  of  facilities  participating  in  the  California  Regional  Clean  Air  Incentives  Market  and 
demographic  variables.  Their  model  allows  them  to  examine  emissions  before  and  after 
implementation  of  the  emission  trading,  controlling  for  county  attainment  status,  community,  and 
demographic  variables.  They  compare  effects  of  the  trading  policy  with  the  counterfactual  of 
traditional command and control regulation. They find that neighborhood demographic characteristics 
are not a statistically significant predictor of changes in emission levels.  
In general, regression analysis is useful for teasing out causal factors behind relationships between 
socio-economic variables and environmental outcomes. However, for purposes of an EJ regulatory 
analysis  most  (with  the  exception  of  [21])  do  little  to  inform  the  question  of  baseline  and  
post-regulatory  scenarios.  Conducting  careful  regression  analysis  is  time  and  data  intensive. 
Consequently,  it  is  likely  to  be  beyond  the  resources  available  for  regulatory  impact  analysis. 
Moreover, while studies such as [21] are able to indicate effectiveness of race or income as a predictor 
of emissions for different policy alternatives, they are not designed to rank these alternatives. 
4. Ranking Distributions 
While the methods described in the previous section are useful for addressing many important 
questions, they do not rank outcomes in a way that answers our third question in a transparent manner. 
Fortunately,  a  set  of  tools  for  ranking  distributions  is  relatively  well  developed  in  the  context  of 
income and health outcomes. The literature on applying these methods to rank environmental policy 
outcomes by their distributional impacts is still in its infancy, however.  Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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In this section, we outline how this literature has been adapted to address environmental justice 
questions, identifying some shortcomings and suggesting some steps forward. We begin with a set of 
visual ranking tools, Lorenz and concentration curves, which allow one to determine easily if one 
distribution of outcomes is more “equitable” than another. These tools are only applicable, however, 
for a small set of possible distributional comparisons. 
We  then  discuss  several  inequality  indices,  the  Gini  coefficient,  the  concentration  index,  the 
Atkinson index and the Kolm-Pollak index. Unlike the visual ranking tools, these indices permit the 
analyst to rank any set of distributions. This universal applicability comes at the expense of imposing 
additional  normative  assumptions,  however.  This  tradeoff  can  be  most  easily  seen  with  the  Gini 
coefficient  and  concentration  index.  Although  these  two  indices  can  be  derived  respectively  from  
the Lorenz and concentration curves, they do not provide identical information as the curves. The 
indices can rank distributions that the curves cannot, but they require the analyst to impose stronger  
normative restrictions. 
4.1. Visual Ranking Tools 
We begin with two visual ranking tools, the Lorenz curve and the concentration curve. These tools 
have the advantage of imposing relatively few ethical standards on an ordering; however, they are 
unable to provide a complete ranking of distributions. In addition, they do not provide much useful 
information  regarding  distribution  of  environmental  outcomes  across  subgroups,  limiting  their 
applicability to EJ analysis.  
Lorenz Curves. If one accepts the ethical premise that it is always desirable to transfer a unit of 
pollution away from a highly exposed individual to a lesser exposed one, then Lorenz curves provide a 
means of ranking policy outcomes. Some hypothetical Lorenz curves for distribution of a pollutant are 
depicted in Figure 1. The horizontal axis of the graph indicates percentiles of the population ranked by 
pollution exposure: 10 corresponds to the ten percent of the population least exposed to the pollutant, 
50 corresponds to the half of the population least exposed to pollution, etc. The vertical axis represents 
the  percent  of  pollution  exposed  by  percentile.  The  black  diagonal  line  depicts  a  perfectly  equal 
distribution of exposure: the lowest 10 percent of the population experience 10 percent of the exposure 
the lowest 50 percent of the population experience half the exposure, etc. 
Curves A, B, and C represent three hypothetical Lorenz curves in which pollution is not distributed 
equally. In curve A, for example, the least exposed half of the population is exposed to 30 percent of 
the pollution, while in curve B the least exposed half experiences only 10 percent of the pollution. 
Lorenz curves have the useful feature that the farther away the curve is from the diagonal, the less 
equal is the distribution. This property can form the basis of a ranking system. Suppose A and B 
represent the predicted distributions of two regulatory options. For now, let us suppose that the two 
policies  result  in  the  same  amount  of  pollution  per  capita.  Option  A  results  in  a  more  equitable 
distribution than Option B. The only value judgment that needs to be imposed to make a preference 
ranking is that one care at all about distributional equity. It does not matter how much one cares about 
exposure at the top or bottom of the distribution. As long as one prefers a more equal distribution to a 
less equal one, a curve that is closer to the diagonal (such as A) is preferable to a curve that is farther 
(such as B). Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Figure 1. Lorenz curves.  
 
 
Although Lorenz curve analysis imposes minimal value judgments on the part of the analyst, it has 
several drawbacks that limit its practical usefulness. First, it is only a partial ordering, meaning that it 
can  only  draw  meaningful  comparisons  for  options  whose  Lorenz  curves  do  not  cross.  A  policy 
generating curve C, for example, cannot be compared with curves A and B since it is closer to the 
diagonal  for  some  range  of  the  population,  but  farther  for  others.  This  property  is  particularly 
problematic if one is interested in several options since the more curves being analyzed the more likely 
that some will cross.  
Second, Lorenz curve analysis is ordinal; one can say that A is preferred to B, but not by how much. 
This ordinal property is related to a third issue. Lorenz curve analysis ignores differences in average 
exposure  levels.  For  example,  if  we  abandon  the  assumption  that  each  distribution  has  the  same 
average pollution level, the exposure levels of the most highly exposed individual in distribution B 
may be lower than the least exposed in distribution A. It may be undesirable to conclude that A is 
preferred to B simply because the exposure is more equitably distributed. Lorenz curves do not provide 
any  means  of  evaluating  a  tradeoff  between  lower  average  exposure  levels  and  a  less  equitable 
distribution.  (The  generalized  Lorenz  curve  developed  by  Shorrocks  [29],  however,  does  allow  a 
partial ordering of distributions with different means.) 
Finally, for purposes of environmental justice analysis, Lorenz curves have the shortcoming that 
they are not easily disaggregated by population subgroups. It is straightforward to use Lorenz curves to 
compare  distributions  of  pollutants  within  a  sub-group  (e.g.,  define  the  population  and  exposure 
percentiles in terms of individuals below a poverty threshold). It is not so easy to use Lorenz curves to 
evaluate distributions across subgroups (e.g., to make statements to the effect that a regulation causes 
pollution  to  be  more  equitably  distributed  across  racial  groups).  Although  Lorenz  curves  can  be 
decomposed by subgroup [30], this decomposition does not allow one to rank distributions as in the 
aggregate Lorenz curve analysis. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Concentration Curves. Like the Lorenz curve, the vertical axis of the concentration curve displays 
the  share  of  an  outcome  variable  experienced  by  a  population.  The  horizontal  axis  displays  the 
cumulative percent of the population ranked by socio-economic status (typically income). A Lorenz 
curve, in contrast, would display the population ranked by exposure. The height of the concentration 
curve  indicates  the  share  of  the  outcome  experienced  by  a  given  cumulative  proportion  of  the 
population.  Figure  2  displays  hypothetical  concentration  curves.  A  perfectly  equal  distribution  of 
outcomes corresponds to a concentration curve along the 45°  line. Kakwani [31] first developed this 
analysis to study income tax progressivity. Wagstaff et al. [32] proposed its use in measuring the 
equity of health outcomes. 
Figure 2. Concentration curves.  
 
Unlike Lorenz curves, concentration curves can cross the 45°  line, and even lie completely above it 
if lower income is correlated with higher outcomes. Concentration curves can rank distributions in a 
manner  similar  to  Lorenz  curves;  for  a  good  outcome,  a  higher  curve  is  socially  more  desirable. 
Concentration curve rankings implicitly employ social preferences such that it is always desirable to 
transfer a good environmental outcome away from a relatively rich individual towards a poorer one, 
even if the poorer individual is slightly poorer and significantly healthier [33]. Note that this normative 
judgment  may  be  more  controversial  than  the  corresponding  assumption  used  for  Lorenz  curve 
analysis (that it is socially desirable to shift good health outcomes to the relatively ill). 
Concentration curve analysis suffers from the same shortcomings as Lorenz curve analysis. It is 
unable to rank distributions whose curves cross, thus providing only a partial ordering. It is ordinal, 
and ignores differences in average exposure levels. It is also unable to evaluate changes in distributions 
between subgroups (other than those based on income). 
In general, both visual ranking tools have some advantages over the visual displays discussed in the 
previous  section.  In  some  cases,  both  Lorenz  and  concentration  curves  allow  comparisons  across Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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policy  alternatives.  In  addition,  concentration  curves  provide  information  regarding  equity  of  an 
environmental outcome with respect to one demographic variable of interest, income. However, both 
curves share the main shortcomings of the other visual displays; they are only effective at comparing 
distributions if there are sufficiently stark differences. If the curves for different policy options cross, 
this analysis provides no effective ranking methodology.  
4.2. Inequality Indices 
An inequality index is a mathematical tool for converting a distribution into a single number. That 
number can then be used to generate an ordering for any set of outcomes, thus addressing the partial 
ordering issue inherent in the Lorenz and concentration curve analyses. For example, a distribution 
with a higher inequality index number is less equal, and hence less preferred than one with a lower 
number.  Moreover,  some  inequality  indices  can  be  decomposed  in  a  manner  that  allows  one  to 
evaluate inequality  both within and between subgroups of interest.  An index value can  also have 
cardinal  (rather  than  just  ordinal)  significance,  i.e.,  the  magnitudes,  not  just  the rankings,  contain 
useful  information.  However,  these  useful  features  come  at the cost of imposing subjective  value 
judgments. In addition, their usefulness for evaluating distributions of bads can be problematic. 
Here, we focus on four families of inequality indices: the Gini coefficient, the concentration index, 
the Atkinson index, and the Kolm-Pollak index. For a discussion of other index numbers in the context 
of income distribution, see [34]; in the context of environmental outcomes, see [10]. These indices can 
be divided into the categories of relative (Gini coefficient, concentration index, and Atkinson index) 
and absolute (Kolm-Pollak index) indices. Relative indices are unaffected by proportionate changes in 
the outcome variable. They are therefore convenient for analysis of variables using different units of 
measurement (e.g., currencies for income analysis). In contrast, absolute indices are unaffected by a 
uniform shift in the outcome variable (i.e., the addition of a constant to every individual’s outcome). 
These properties are mutually exclusive, and there is no unambiguous reason to choose one category of 
index over another. As argued by [35], however, relative indexes can be misleading. Suppose the 
income of both members of a population of two individuals doubles. If prices do not change the 
difference  in  purchasing  power  between  the  two  would  also  double,  suggesting  that  the  new 
distribution is less equal. An absolute inequality index would increase to reflect this change, while 
relative index would not. 
Blackorby and Donaldson [36,37] show that relative and absolute indices that depend only on one 
variable  have  an  associated  ordinal  social  evaluation  function  (the  proofs  do  not  apply  to  the 
concentration  index  since  it  depends  on  two  variables,  environmental  outcome  and  income).  The 
equally distributed equivalent (EDE) value of a distribution is the amount of the outcome variable that, 
if given equally to every individual in the population, would leave society just as well off as the actual, 
unequal distribution. The EDE thus embodies a set of social preferences and is a measure of social 
welfare that enables rankings of distributions with different means. The Gini coefficient, Atkinson 
index, and Kolm-Pollak index can all be expressed as functions of their associated EDEs. 
Choosing a specific type of index with which to rank policies is thus equivalent to choosing a 
particular social evaluation function on which to base the policy decision. Since the values of the 
associated social evaluation function do depend on the average value of the outcome variable (not just Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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the distribution), they provide an additional tool with which the analyst can compare policy outcomes 
that differ in both mean and distribution in a logically consistent manner. 
Although the social evaluation functions are ordinal, the associated inequality indices are cardinal. 
A relative index answers the question, “What percent of the average amount of the good would society 
be willing to sacrifice if the remainder were allocated evenly across the population?” An absolute 
index answers the question, “What is the amount of the good per capita society would be willing to 
sacrifice if the remainder were allocated evenly across the population?” Thus, magnitudes, not just 
ranking of the indexes are significant. 
Gini Coefficient. The Gini coefficient is the most widely used inequality index. Its popularity is 
likely due more to the fact that it is easily understood as an increasing function of the area between a 
Lorenz curve and the diagonal line representing perfect equality than to desirable theoretical properties. 
The Gini coefficient has the undesirable feature that the effect of a transfer on the index number 
depends on the individuals’ ranks, not the difference in outcomes. In contrast to the widely accepted 
principle that an inequality index should place greater weight on transfers among the relatively worse 
off,  for  a  typical  bell-shaped  distribution  a  transfer  between  individuals  in  the  middle  of  the 
distribution will have a higher effect on the Gini coefficient than a transfer between two similarly 
distanced individuals at either tail [38]. There are ways of modifying the Gini coefficient to introduce 
flexibility in the weights placed on different segments of the population [39,40]. These techniques are 
rarely used in practice, however. 
The Gini coefficient also has the undesirable property that the effect of a transfer on the index 
depends on the endowment of a third individual; if that individual is ranked between the first two, the 
transfer will have a greater impact than if not (since there will be a greater rank difference between the 
first two individuals in the former case). Finally, and particularly troublesome for EJ analysis, the Gini 
coefficient cannot generally be used to decompose aggregate inequality into within and between group 
components  in  an  internally  consistent  manner  [34].  Specifically,  constructing  an  EDE  for  each 
subpopulation and then using these to construct an aggregate EDE for the entire population does not 
yield the same result as calculating the aggregate EDE directly. 
Although it is a simple matter to compute a Gini coefficient if the outcome of concern is a bad 
(rather  than  a  good),  the  resulting  measure  does  not  have  a  sensible  associated  social  evaluation 
function (since it would be increasing in the bad). It is an ordinal ranking of dispersion, but loses the 
cardinal interpretation of a relative inequality measure since the EDE is smaller than the mean (for a 
bad it should be larger). Thus, it does not indicate the percent increase in average pollution that could 
be tolerated in exchange for a perfectly equal distribution. Consequently, the Gini coefficient can 
provide useful comparisons for distributions with the same mean level of a bad, but cannot be used in 
conjunction with a social evaluation function to rank distributions with different means. Moreover, 
using the Gini coefficient in this way can be misleading since it can generate different policy rankings 
if  one  uses  a  bad  as  the  outcome  variable  versus  its  complementary  good.  Calculating  the  Gini 
coefficient for ambient concentrations of parts per billion of an air pollutant, for example, yields a 
different ranking of policy outcomes than using the same data to calculate a Gini coefficient for parts 
per billion of “clean” air. 
There are several examples of applications using the Gini coefficient to analyze distributions of 
health and environmental outcomes. Among the ﬁrst were [41], who used a Gini coefficient to track Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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evolution  in  age  at  death  (a  good)  over  time  in  Great  Britain.  Heil  and  Wodon  [42]  use  a  Gini 
coefficient to examine the distribution of predicted CO2 emissions across countries grouped by income. 
Millimet and Slottje [43] use the Gini coefficient to compare distributions of pollution across states 
grouped by income class. Since the Gini coefficient does not satisfy consistency in aggregation both of 
these studies required a group overlap term in addition to between and within group terms. Millimet 
and Slottje [44] use the Gini coefficient to evaluate the effect of regulatory compliance costs on the 
distribution of toxics reported in the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory across U.S. states and counties. 
They combine regression results with Spearman correlations between demographic characteristics and 
emissions to argue that policies that increase inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient increase 
racial disparities. In these studies, the Gini coefficient has been used primarily as an ordinal measure of 
dispersion, without attendant welfare implications. 
Concentration  Index.  The  concentration  index  is  similar  to  the  Gini  coefficient,  being  an 
increasing function of the difference between the 45°  line and the concentration (rather than Lorenz) 
curve. For details on the practical use of the concentration index, see [15]. Its value ranges from −1 (the 
entire outcome is borne by the poorest individual) to 1 (the entire outcome is borne by the wealthiest 
individual). Since the concentration curve can cross the 45°  line, zero either indicates perfect equality or 
that the area above the curve is exactly equal to the area below it. As with the Gini coefficient, the effect 
of allocating a unit of the outcome variable to an individual is weighted by the individual’s rank. With 
the concentration index, the relevant rank is income, rather than the outcome variable.  
The concentration index can provide a complete ordering in the sense that lower values are always 
more “pro-poor” (for distribution of a good) than higher values. The cardinal relationship between 
magnitudes  of  concentration  index  numbers  lacks  the  clear  intuition  of  the  other  three  indices 
considered here, however. This is not to say that there is no intuitive interpretation. Koolman and van 
Doorslaer [45] provide a link between the index value and the proportionate amount of the outcome 
variable that would need to be redistributed from the richest to the poorest half of the population in 
order to attain an index value of zero (not necessarily equality). 
Like the Gini coefficient, the concentration index value depends on individuals’ ranks, not absolute 
differences. It also shares the trait that ordering based on the concentration index can be sensitive to 
whether the outcome variable is expressed as a good or its “bad” complement [46]. It inherits from the 
concentration curves the questionable normative assumption that transfers of a good environmental 
outcome from rich to poor is always desirable [47]. 
Atkinson Index. The Atkinson index satisfies several desirable theoretical properties lacking in 
other relative indices [35,36,38]. Among these are that it is a function of individual allocations rather 
than rank, and it can be disaggregated into subgroups in a consistent manner (see also [48]). 
In its formula, the Atkinson index explicitly incorporates ethical considerations with an inequality 
aversion  parameter  that  ranges  from  zero  to  infinity.  This  parameter  introduces  some  flexibility, 
allowing the analyst to specify the amount society is willing to  trade a reduction in the outcome 
variable  for  one  individual  for  an  increase  for  another.  A  value  of  zero  implies  that  society  is 
indifferent between transfers between any two individuals. The higher the parameter’s value, the more 
weight society places on transfers to individuals with lower outcomes. Since the choice of a parameter 
value is entirely normative, it is common to calculate Atkinson indexes for several values to determine 
how sensitive rankings are to the choice. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Although the Atkinson index has many desirable properties when used to analyze distributions of 
goods, it is not so convenient for analyzing bad outcomes. As with the Gini coefficient, inputting a bad 
into  the  Atkinson  formula  removes  any  cardinal  welfare  significance  since  the  associated  social 
evaluation function would be increasing in the bad. It also causes the index to place more weight upon 
the most well-off individuals (those with low outcomes), rather than the worst off. The Atkinson index 
is generally not defined for negative numbers, thus precluding a simple redefinition of bads in that way. 
Even for examples in which negative values are defined, the Atkinson Index generates the perverse 
result that a progressive redistribution reduces social welfare [49]. 
Transforming a bad into a good by replacing it with its complement (e.g., parts per billion of a 
pollutant to parts per billion of “clean” air, or the probability of not dying from cancer) may have the 
undesirable result of rendering an index value so small as to be within rounding error. To put this in 
perspective, consider the relative income distribution of a society of billionaires who differed in wealth 
by only a few dollars. It would be almost perfectly equal, with the value of the corresponding Atkinson 
index being extremely close to zero. Note that this does not mean that the distributional effects are 
insignificant. If the good were clean air or probability of not dying from cancer the percent reduction 
society would be willing to give up for an equal distribution might be quite small, but the value of that 
reduction might be significant. Nonetheless, presenting the results in a manner such that a regulation 
changes the Atkinson Index by a miniscule amount may not be easy to interpret. 
Although the Atkinson index is commonly used in income distribution analysis, it has rarely been 
used to measure environmental or health outcomes. Waters [50] used an Atkinson index to analyze 
distribution of access to health care (a good) in Ecuador. Levy et al. [20] used the Atkinson index to 
evaluate the distribution of mortality risk resulting from alternative power plant air pollution control 
strategies  in  the  United  States.  Levy  et  al.  [51]  used  the  Atkinson  index  to  analyze  reduction  in 
mortality risk from particulate matter reductions from regulating transportation. Each of these studies 
used the Atkinson index as a measure of dispersion without welfare significance.  
Kolm-Pollak  Index.  The  Kolm-Pollak  index  shares  the  desirable  theoretical  properties  of  the 
Atkinson  index  [35,37,48].  It  also  uses  an  inequality  aversion  parameter  to  specify  the  relative 
importance of allocations to different segments of the population. Higher values correspond to greater 
weight being placed on the worse off and zero indicates complete indifference to the allocation. 
In contrast with the other indices examined here, the Kolm-Pollak index readily accommodates bad 
outcomes. It is inappropriate to input bad values directly into the index. However, one can simply 
multiply them by minus one and add them to some arbitrary benchmark. This operation preserves the 
appropriate social evaluation function ranking and is equivalent to measuring the distribution of a 
complementary “good.” The property of an absolute index that adding the same amount to everyone in 
the population does not change its value helps in this regard; the value of the index is independent of 
the benchmark level. To date, the Kolm-Pollak index has not been used in the analysis of environment 
or health outcomes, and there are few examples of its application in income analysis (an exception  
is [52]). 
In general, the Atkinson and Kolm-Pollak inequality indices have the potential to inform all three 
questions posed in Section 2. They can provide a concise snapshot the dispersion of environmental 
outcomes for baseline and policy scenarios, both within and across population subgroups. In terms of 
ranking outcomes, they can be used to determine whether policy alternatives improve the dispersion of Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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outcomes, holding the total amount of the outcome constant. For good outcomes the social evaluation 
functions  associated  with  both  indices  can  also  be  used  to  rank  alternatives  for  which  both  the 
dispersion  and  total  amount  of  pollution  vary.  Only  the  Kolm-Pollak  index  appears  suitable  for 
evaluation of bad outcomes, however. 
5. Conclusions  
For  at  least  the  past  thirty  years,  the  academic  literature  has  used  a  variety  of  methods  for 
quantifying the relationship between environmental quality and vulnerable sub-populations. In general, 
methods have been chosen with respect to their usefulness in answering questions posed by a particular 
study. As a result, there has been little attempt to develop a consistent framework to be used across 
studies, much less one suitable for the questions likely to be important for regulatory analysis. While 
use  of a  common environmental justice  metric would be convenient for making comparisons and 
drawing conclusions across academic studies, it is essential for undertaking regulatory impact analysis 
in a consistent and transparent manner across different rules. In this section we discuss how well the 
tools presented in Sections 3 and 4 address the questions for regulatory EJ analysis posed in Section 2.  
Visual displays, whether GIS maps, Lorenz curves, or concentration curves have the advantage of 
illuminating sharp disparities. Maps, for example, can be effective at indicating situations in which 
pollution levels are highly concentrated in locations with large numbers of residents belonging to 
vulnerable subpopulations. They are less useful for analysis of alternatives in which differences are 
less pronounced and not obvious to the naked eye. Nor do they suggest a means of ranking tradeoffs 
between total pollution reductions and reductions in disparities. Similarly, Lorenz and concentration 
curves are most helpful when there are sharp differences in policy options. They are not as informative 
if policy alternatives generate curves that cross. In general, visual displays have the disadvantage that 
they are not easily comparable across many alternatives, whether for an analysis of several options for 
implementing a given rule, or a comprehensive analysis across rules. 
Subgroup summary statistics such as mean exposure rates have the advantage of being simple to 
calculate  and  easily  understood.  They  provide  useful  information  regarding  baseline  conditions, 
potentially providing a signal if vulnerable subgroups are more highly exposed.  
These  statistics  have  two  important  shortcomings,  however.  First,  they  do  not  provide  detailed 
information regarding distribution of outcomes within a group. This information can be important 
since the impact of a pollutant may be more of a concern if it is concentrated in a hotspot among a 
relatively small group of individuals than if it is evenly spread across the sub-population. Second, they 
do  not  provide  a  clear  ranking  of  alternatives  in  a  systematic  way.  Different  policy  options  may 
involve tradeoffs between total improvements across all groups and reducing the disparities among 
some groups. Simple averages do not provide a transparent way to resolve these conflicts. 
Regression analysis can be effective in determining causality (e.g., if race is a determining factor in 
pollution exposure). This approach can be useful for identifying existing baseline disparities and for 
conducting retrospective studies. It does not appear to be well suited, however, for ranking impacts of 
hypothetical regulatory options.  
Inequality indices seem to be a promising tool for addressing all three questions posed in Section 2. 
They provide a means of evaluating the distribution of environmental outcomes both within and across Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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subgroups at baseline. Inequality indices can use model simulation results to predict distributional 
effects of various regulatory alternatives. Moreover, due to their associated social evaluation functions, 
they provide a transparent and consistent means of ranking alternatives for which both total pollution 
levels  and  their  relative  distributions  vary.  They  do  so  at  the  cost  of  imposing  restrictive  value 
judgments  on  the  analysis,  especially  with  respect  to  the  level  of  inequality  aversion.  Sensitivity 
analysis over a range of inequality aversion parameter values can moderate this normative influence. 
Inequality indices have the advantage of a robust theoretical literature describing their properties as 
well as many practical applications in the context of income distribution analysis. Two of the most 
commonly used indices in that context, the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson index, have undesirable 
theoretical properties if used to measure the distributions of a “bad” like pollution, rather than a “good” 
like income. Specifically, the corresponding social evaluation functions are not well behaved, thus 
invalidating  their  potential  for  ranking  options  that  have  different  tradeoffs  between  total 
improvements and reducing disparities. The concentration index, commonly used to evaluate health 
outcomes by income levels, has a relatively weak theoretical foundation; the corresponding social 
evaluation function is not as well understood. Perhaps more importantly for EJ analysis, however, is its 
inability to evaluate distributions across subpopulations that are not defined by income. 
In contrast, the Kolm-Pollak index shares desirable theoretical traits of the Atkinson index while 
being able to accommodate evaluation of distributions of bads. In contrast with the other indices, 
however, it has a thin record of empirical applications in the context of income distribution and, to our 
knowledge, no published applications in the context of environmental outcomes. 
Where does this leave the analyst in terms of determining a consistent and transparent method for 
evaluating distributional effects in regulatory analysis? Inequality indices show potential for meeting 
the needs of consistency in a regulatory analysis. Data are likely to be available across regulatory 
settings  to  estimate  a  Kolm-Pollak  index,  which  shows  the  most  promise  for  evaluating  adverse 
environmental outcomes. This index could thus enable the decision maker to evaluate EJ consistently 
for a variety of rules. In addition, visual displays, summary statistics, and regression analysis provide 
useful supplementary information that can contribute to a richer understanding of potential EJ issues 
than a set of index numbers alone. 
The two main impediments to using a Kolm-Pollak index in an EJ component of regulatory analysis 
are the lack of peer-reviewed applications and its lack of familiarity among policy-makers and the 
public. For it to become a useful policy tool, both of these issues need to be addressed by further 
academic research and pilot applications. Research regarding an appropriate range of values for the 
inequality  aversion  parameter  is  particularly  important.  This  research  may  involve  initial  costs 
associated with both mastering practical techniques involved in its calculation, as well as costs to the 
user in terms of understanding the output. Such costs are likely to be small, however, compared to the 
relative advantage of a better understanding the distributional effects of environmental policy. 
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